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Directly adjacent to the Thomas J. Moyer Ohio Judicial Center in Columbus, 
Ohio, which is the home of the Supreme Court of Ohio, sits a beautiful water 
fountain.  The artist who created it called it “In principle and in practice.”  At the 
base of the fountain visitors can view many of the words we identify as basic tenets 
of our judicial system, including truth, honesty, and integrity.  These tenets are the 
very values upon which our system for resolving disputes operates.  Visitors will not 
see words such as “backroom deal” or “legal fiction.”  Yet those who participate in 
our state’s criminal justice system know all too well that phrases such as these factor 
heavily in resolving a significant percentage of cases and, at the same time, threaten 
the public’s confidence in our legal system. 
In 2015, the Supreme Court of Ohio seriously considered requiring all 
negotiated plea agreements to rest upon a factual basis.  This effort was designed to 
eliminate the practice of resolving cases with “fictional pleas;” in other words, 
allowing the accused to resolve the case by pleading to a crime that he or she did not 
commit.  The proposed amendment was modest in its intended application.  Quite 
simply, the rule would have required trial courts to do the following: before 
accepting a plea agreement that resolved the case by having the defendant admit to 
a charge that did not resemble the original charge, the court would have the parties 
first state facts on the record that, if true, supported the charge to which the defendant 
was agreeing to plead guilty.  Without comment this proposal was voted down by 
the Supreme Court of Ohio, resulting in this unfortunate headline in the Columbus 
Dispatch: “State Supreme Court rejects truth-in-sentencing rule.”1   
Prior to joining the Supreme Court this year, I was privileged to serve for 
fourteen years as a trial court judge in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common 
Pleas.  There I had the opportunity every day to observe hardworking prosecutors 
and defense attorneys resolve virtually every type of criminal case imaginable.  This 
experience cemented my firm belief that when all parties are doing their jobs 
correctly, and a detailed and accurate record is maintained, the law’s inherent 
procedural checks and balances and substantive protections will produce a just 
result.  And justice comes in many forms: the guilty being held accountable and 
 
1   Randy Ludlow, State Supreme Court rejects truth-in-sentencing rule, COLUMBUS DISPATCH 
(Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.dispatch.com/article/20160115/NEWS/301159652. 
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punished proportionally, consistent with the goals of public safety and rehabilitation; 
defendants acquitted where the evidence fails to meet the high standard of proof of 
beyond a reasonable doubt—a standard that protects us all from a government 
otherwise empowered to strip away our freedoms; and the wrongfully accused, 
exonerated by either a dismissal, not guilty verdict, or by a court vacating the 
conviction.  In my years of presiding over thousands of felony cases, I’ve seen them 
all.  
 
II. THE PREVALENCE OF PLEA BARGAINING 
 
When I look back on all my years as a trial court judge, it is easy to focus first 
on the many interesting and dramatic jury trials I have experienced.  However, if 
one were to perform a detailed analysis of how much time I spent managing my 
criminal docket, one would find the overwhelming majority of the time was spent 
conducting plea hearings and sentencing hearings.  The truth is that over 97% of all 
criminal cases in Ohio in 2018 were resolved not by a trial, but through negotiated 
plea agreements.2  Retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice Kennedy once noted, “That 
is what plea bargaining is.  It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; 
it is the criminal justice system.”3  Since 2016, I have accepted many invitations to 
speak to citizens to explain the intricacies of our criminal justice system, specifically 
as it relates to negotiated plea agreements—my  presentation is entitled The Mystery 
of Plea Agreements.  Likewise, I have written this article to shed light on a process, 
which for the most part remains shrouded from public view. 
As a trial judge I received new criminal cases on my docket on a daily basis.  
At the first pretrial hearing the prosecutor and defense counsel were provided with 
a firm trial date to resolve the case.  Trial date certainty, as every practitioner knows, 
provides the energy that fuels the entire criminal justice system.  On the date set for 
trial one of three outcomes would take place: 
 
• The case would proceed to trial and the government would be held to 
the burden of proving the truth of the charges beyond a reasonable 
doubt; 
• The case would be dismissed, either by the prosecutor or the court, if 
the government was not prepared to go forward and did not have a 
good reason for the case to be continued; or 
• A negotiated plea agreement was reached and was ready to be 
presented to the court completely resolving the dispute. 
 
In every single case the prosecutor, whose ethical obligation is first and foremost to 
seek truth and justice, and not necessarily a conviction, must make a judgment call 
 
2   THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, 2018 OHIO COURTS STATISTICAL SUMMARY 26–29 (2018). 
3   Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & 
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
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on how to exercise his or her wide discretion.  The prosecutor may decide that the 
circumstances demand that the defendant be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the 
law commensurate with a sentence proportional to his or her conduct.  Alternatively, 
the prosecutor might determine there are reasons to exercise restraint in exchange 
for resolving the case short of proceeding to trial.   
In Cuyahoga County, most assistant prosecutors tasked with prosecuting a 
felony case (commonly referred to as “room prosecutors” because they are assigned 
to serve on a particular floor containing a number of courtrooms) have virtually no 
discretion to make the above described judgment calls.  Like many major 
metropolitan prosecutor’s offices, discretion is exercised by supervisors, usually a 
more seasoned prosecutor chosen to review and supervise the room prosecutors.  
After a room prosecutor has exercised his or her due diligence in assessing the merits 
of the case to ensure that a plea bargain is appropriate, the room prosecutor must 
then convince the supervisor of this position. 
The same is true even if the prosecutor has doubts about the theory of guilt put 
forth by the law enforcement agency that initiated the charges.  Convincing a 
supervising prosecutor to dismiss a charge outright is often a very daunting task.  In 
my experience, the institutional pressure against outright dismissal of felony cases 
that have been formally indicted by a grand jury is extremely strong.  A “weak” case 
is much more likely first to be “marked” (meaning authorized) by the supervisor, to 
an enticing misdemeanor plea offer before being dismissed outright. 
The defendant, in many cases, may be aware of some facts regarding his or her 
alleged conduct that might lead to a conviction, and thus, may consider entering into 
an agreement in order to obtain a benefit in exchange for an admission.  The benefit 
will most likely be in the form of some degree of leniency in sentencing 
consequences.  
A typical plea bargain may involve the prosecutor dismissing a number of 
counts in exchange for an admission on one or more counts, potentially limiting the 
accused’s punishment liability.  Alternatively, the prosecutor, facing the high burden 
of proving a serious charge, may offer a defendant a chance to plea to a legally 
recognized lesser included offense to the charged crime, also effectively limiting the 
punishment liability.  For example, the prosecutor may offer a defendant charged 
with rape, which is a felony of the first degree, an opportunity to resolve the case by 
admitting to the crime of gross sexual imposition, which is a lower felony of the 
third degree.  An offense is a lesser included offense if: (1) the original (greater) 
offense carries a more severe penalty; (2) some element of the greater offense is not 
required to prove commission of the lesser offense; and (3) the greater offense as 
statutorily defined cannot be committed without the lesser offense as statutorily 
defined also having been committed.4 
Another possibility might involve a prosecutor’s offer to incorporate Ohio’s 
attempt statute to the indicted charge, i.e., attempted rape, attempted felonious 
assault, or attempted robbery.  This is often utilized even if the victim insists the 
 
4   State v. Evans, 122 Ohio St. 3d 381 (2009). 
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crime was fully completed.  Ohio’s attempt statute has the mechanical ability to 
reduce any charge to which I t is attached by one full felony degree.  This can reduce 
a charge which carries a legal presumption in favor of a prison sentence to one that 
carries no such presumption.  Such an offer can remove the potential possibility of 
multiple years from a defendant’s prison sentence.  This benefit is used so frequently 
in Cuyahoga County that it has, in my opinion, eclipsed the original intent of the 
attempt statute, which was to treat uncompleted crimes with a degree of leniency.5  
Instead, “attempt” has become a de facto bargaining chip in the negotiation process 
and a strong incentive for the accused to enter the agreement.  
Perhaps one of the strongest “benefits” in a prosecutor’s tool belt involves the 
existence of crimes that carry a legislative mandate requiring a mandatory prison 
sentence.  For instance, if a defendant is alleged to have brandished a firearm during 
an aggravated robbery, such a charge will often carry what is known as a three-year 
gun specification.6  If convicted by a jury of this specification, the defendant must 
serve three full years of incarceration before he or she begins to serve day one on 
the underlying sentence of aggravated robbery, a crime that carries with it a sentence 
of anywhere from three to eleven years.7  Whether this mandatory charge remains 
attached to the initial charge of aggravated robbery is entirely up to the prosecutor’s 
discretion.  Even if the act of brandishing a gun was caught on video, the prosecutor 
has the ability to offer to remove the three-year gun specification, which in effect 
serves as a powerful inducement for the accused to take the plea deal.8  
Once the arm’s length negotiations between the prosecutor and defense counsel 
take place and both sides reach a tentative agreement, there is one thing left to do: 
present the agreement to the trial judge, who under the law has discretion to either 
accept or reject the proposed plea agreement.9  That, unfortunately, is where things 
get murky. 
 
III. AN OPAQUE PROCESS 
 
Once a tentative agreement has been reached in a criminal dispute, the 
adversarial parties will present the agreement to the judge for approval.  When I 
started my legal career as an assistant prosecutor, and into my first term as a trial 
 
5   According to Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court records, between January 1, 2017 and 
February 3, 2020, a total of 1,129 cases were indicted with at least one count of attempt under OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.02, compared to 5,719 cases during this same period where attempt was 
ultimately incorporated  into the final resolution.   
6   OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.14(B)(1)(ii), 2941.145 (West 2020). 
7   OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2911.01(c), 2929.14(A)(1)(b) (West 2020). 
8   One other additional benefit may involve the prosecutor agreeing to take a particular position 
in the sentencing hearing, which is favorable to the defendant.  In some cases, the court may be 
amenable to accepting the parties’ agreed upon sentence.   
9   OHIO R. CRIM. P. 11(F), (G). 
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court judge, this process would usually involve an informal, off the record discussion 
between the lawyers and the judge back in the judge’s chambers.  
As a young assistant prosecutor, during these backroom discussions, I was 
eager to convey to the judge that both sides had fully participated in the discovery 
process and, as a result, were fully in command of the underlying facts of the case.  
Further, I would advocate that the proposed agreement reflected, to a satisfactory 
degree, the truth about what actually took place on the date in question.  I would 
conclude by stating that having now arrived at what was believed to be a fair 
disposition, the parties were ready to proceed to the next step of the process with the 
court deciding what the appropriate sentence should be according to law.  
The defense attorney often used this off the record opportunity to highlight 
mitigating factors about the case and his or her client.  Most importantly from the 
defense perspective, the discussion was viewed as a chance (to the extent a particular 
judge would allow it) to explore the judge’s mindset regarding what sentence the 
client would receive if the plea was deemed acceptable by the court.  
A systematic flaw, and the most troubling aspect of this critical point in the 
process, relates to the trial court’s discretion to either accept or reject the parties’ 
plea agreement.  Judges look to the law for guidance in their decision-making 
authority that will hopefully lead to fair and uniform decisions.  The law instructs 
the judge in many ways.  For instance, in every jury trial, after the prosecutor 
concludes his or her case, the defense attorney, as a matter of course, will move for 
an acquittal.  At that point, the law instructs a trial court judge to examine the record, 
in “a light most favorable to the prosecution.”10  This is done to determine whether 
sufficient evidence has been presented as to each and every element of the charge 
that, if believed by the trier of fact, could sustain a conviction on that charge. 
Unfortunately, however, the law comes up woefully short in providing 
guidance to the trial court judge when determining whether to accept or reject a plea 
agreement.  It is well settled that our trial court judges enjoy wide and unfettered 
discretion in deciding whether to accept or reject a plea agreement.11  Indeed, a 
defendant has no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted at all.  
In the absence of any clear constitutional or statutory law direction, a 
fundamental systemic flaw is exposed: the disparate judicial philosophies that exist 
and operate among the hundreds of state court judges regarding the judge’s role in 
the plea negotiation process.  Essentially, each individual judge has his or her own 
approach in exercising their discretionary power to accept a plea and impose a 
sentence upon a criminal defendant.  
As the neutral arbiter in the adversarial process, I always viewed my role as a 
check on the entire process.  My philosophy was to listen to the positions of both 
sides to ensure that the defendant was prepared to enter the proposed plea agreement 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and that the proposed plea agreement was 
negotiated with zealous representation from both sides so as to form the basis of an 
 
10  See OHIO R. CRIM. P. 29(A); and State v. Ramirez, 2020-Ohio-602 (Ohio).   
11  OHIO R. CRIM. P. 11(G). 
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arm’s length transaction.  I would carefully consider both sides’ positions, weighing 
their arguments with the known facts, in order to ascertain a disposition that was 
within the parameters advocated by the parties. 
In my courtroom, I always made clear that I was amenable to plea agreements 
that included agreed sentences negotiated by the parties.  After all, they knew more 
about the facts and procedural hurdles in the underlying case than I did.  If the parties 
were unable to reach an agreed sentence, I would conduct a sentencing hearing.  
Although I had many opportunities in my fourteen years as a trial judge to use my 
discretion to sentence a defendant above what the prosecuting attorney advocated, I 
never did. 
Some of my former colleagues on the trial bench, however, take a different 
view regarding the power to sentence a defendant.  Some judges view it as solely 
and inherently within the authority of the judge.  As a result, these judges tell the 
parties that although they are free to advance sentencing recommendations, the judge 
will not be bound by any position advocated by the parties.  These judges will tell 
the parties that they retain unfettered discretion within statutory limits and will often 
impose a sentence that is more severe than that which was advocated by the 
prosecutor.  
Some judges in our system have developed personal plea policies and, for 
instance, will tell prosecutors and defense lawyers that they will refuse a proposed 
plea agreement that reduces a felony charge to a misdemeanor.  Also, at times, some 
judges have refused to accept a prosecutor’s good faith attempt to dismiss the case.  
Further complicating and frustrating practitioners, who must navigate among these 
individual philosophies, is the speculative uncertainty over how far each judge is 
willing to go to communicate to the parties what they are inclined to do regarding 
the sentence.  If the judge makes a sentencing commitment in chambers, it is an 
unspoken rule in some courtrooms that such a commitment is not to be 
communicated publicly, especially at the plea hearing.  Therefore, defense counsel 
must often privately instruct his or her client to unequivocally answer “no” when 
asked at the hearing if any promises have been made to induce the plea, 
Occasionally in the courtrooms where this occurs, a defendant will forget this 
important instruction from the attorney and state at the plea hearing something to 
the effect like: “Yes, my attorney told me I would receive a minimum sentence.”  
There are scores of transcripts where something like this has occurred.  The 
embarrassed defense attorney will then usually say something like, “Judge, may I 
please speak to my client off the record?”  And then miraculously the client will 
resume back on the record, “No your honor, no promises have been made to me.”  
At the other end of the spectrum are trial court judges who refuse to make any 
commitment regarding the sentence, leaving defendants not with a negotiated 
benefit but merely the hope of a benefit at the sentencing hearing.  There are 
multitudes of cases from such courtrooms where defendants were induced into a plea 
agreement where the prosecutor offered to change a charge that carried mandatory 
prison time to one that did not.  In many of these cases the prosecutor will remain 
silent at the plea hearing regarding the sentence they intend to advocate for at the 
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sentencing hearing.  Consequently, defendants have appeared at their sentencing 
hearings hoping for probation, or a minimum sentence, but who instead received 
severe, sometimes decades-long sentences.  They leave the courtroom shell-
shocked, wondering just what benefit they received in exchange for their plea.  I 
refer to this phenomenon as “sentencing by ambush.” 
 
IV. THE SPOTLIGHT OF TRANSPARENCY 
 
There came a time during my first term as a trial court judge when I began to 
question the way I was conducting these important informal plea negotiation 
discussions back in my chambers.  I started to feel uncomfortable discussing aspects 
of a proposed plea agreement outside the presence of the two most important 
stakeholders in the process: the accused, whose life would often be profoundly 
affected by the agreement, and of no less importance, the victim, who was seeking 
justice and accountability.  Eventually, after much thought, I experienced the major 
epiphany of my legal career: No stakeholder in the plea negotiation process, 
including the judge, should ever say anything in chambers and off the record 
that he or she would not repeat verbatim in open court while on the record.  
Subsequently, I told my bailiff that I was going to change how I interacted with 
the attorneys.  I explained to the attorneys appearing before me that I would continue 
to be as accessible as ever to discuss any aspect of a proposed plea agreement.  
However, those discussions would no longer take place in my chambers.  From that 
day forward, these discussions would take place in open court and on the record.  I 
cannot overstate the revelatory awakening that occurred the first time I began to 
conduct the process in this manner.  
When parties are placed on the record, it naturally forces the adversaries to 
focus on the strengths and weaknesses of the case.  No one wants to be caught lying 
or embellishing the facts on the record.  No one wants to appear coercive or 
threatening.  Instead, by conducting these discussions in open court and on the 
record, the parties focus on their positions and the known facts of the case, and 
everyone in the process, including the judge, is held accountable for what they say.   
It worked like this: at the court hearings, the prosecutor would typically start 
by outlining the framework of the proposed plea agreement and the proposed benefit 
being extended to the accused in exchange for an admission of guilt.  Victims, who 
have the right to be present and are encouraged to attend the hearing, are then given 
the opportunity to correct any factual inaccuracies and provide the court with impact 
testimony regarding the crime.  Defense counsel would then acknowledge their 
understanding of what was outlined and, just like we used to discuss in chambers, 
would often raise the issue of sentencing.  At this point, I would typically turn to the 
prosecutor and ask what position they intended to take at the sentencing hearing and 
whether the facts of the case, the defendant’s background, and our sentencing laws 
supported such a position.  Many times, the prosecution would voice no objection 
to probation or would indicate that they were taking no position regarding the 
sentence and instead, would leave sentencing to the sound discretion of the court.   
430  OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW  Vol. 17:423 
I would then address defense counsel and have the very same discussion.  
Afterward, I would consider the overall principles and purposes of felony sentencing 
embodied in our criminal statutory code,12 and offer my reasons on the record as to 
why I believed the facts supported the sentence I was considering.  In more serious 
cases, if I needed additional time to consider all of the relevant facts and law, I would 
defer my decision and continue the matter for another day.  I would then refer the 
defendant to the probation department for a presentence investigation.  I would 
inform the parties that if all facts were verified as represented by the parties, I was 
prepared to issue that sentence.  Thus, at the future sentencing hearing, I too, was 
held accountable for what I represented on the record.  
This became my standard practice in conducting plea negotiations for well over 
a decade.  Frequently, during such on-the-record hearings, I would have the parties 
state the factual basis of the charges to which the defendant was admitting.  I let the 
attorneys know in advance about my “blanket” policy governing all plea agreements, 
insisting that they maintain a factual basis.  This policy could be found on my 
informational page on the court’s website.  This is important because there are some 
state appellate court decisions that suggest it is plain error for a trial court to maintain 
a blanket policy governing plea agreements.13  A close examination of these cases 
reveal they usually involve a trial court judge with an individual arbitrary policy, for 
instance, a failure to plead by a certain date will result in a forfeiture of the ability 
to plead or a court refusal to accept a no-contest plea.14  My blanket policy, which I 
believe promoted transparency and accountability for all parties, was never 
challenged during my tenure as a trial court judge.  
 
V. FLAWS WITHIN THE SYSTEM 
 
The vast majority of cases that enter the system will not proceed to trial, and if 
the essential facts are no longer in dispute, a trial becomes unnecessary.  A plea 
negotiation—if everyone is performing their function as designed—will result in a 
fair and just resolution.  Cases where defendants have been overcharged can be 
adjusted appropriately once an effective defense lawyer is given the opportunity to 
bring this fact to light to reasonable prosecutors.  
However, when one or more of the parties (judge, prosecutor, or defense 
attorney) does not perform their roles as designed, there is a real danger of grave 
injustice.  One particular type of injustice involves the acceptance of factually 
baseless plea agreements.  These occur where a court permits a defendant to resolve 
the case by pleading to a crime that the defendant did not commit.  There are some 
occasions where if the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the parties will enter 
what some have described as “creative” negotiations to create what lawyers refer to 
 
12  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2911.11, 2911.12 (West 2020). 
13  See, e.g., State v. Beasley, 152 Ohio St.3d 470, 474 (2018).   
14  Id.  
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as “legal fictions,” more commonly understood by the layperson as “lies.”  I believe 
such legal fictions, a.k.a. lies, operate as a fraud on the unsuspecting public.  
Pleas like these are sometimes difficult to spot because of the general public’s 
lack of understanding regarding the factual elements that support the crimes that are 
being offered to the defendant as “legal fictions.”  Occasionally, however, they can 
be blatant; for example, in a particular Cuyahoga County case a defendant was 
charged with multiple counts of downloading child pornography and one count of 
possession of criminal tools, presumably concerning the computer used to commit 
these alleged criminal acts.  What were the potential truths about these allegations 
that could exist?  One truth might be that the defendant committed these offenses 
and was guilty of the alleged criminal conduct.  Another truth might be that the 
crimes were committed by someone else.  But what we know was not true is that the 
defendant did not commit the crime of felonious assault, even though that is what he 
was allowed to plead to in order to resolve this case.  
How did this plea happen?  What were the reasons behind the plea agreement, 
which drove the parties to resolve the case in this manner, reaching a conclusion that 
no jury would have been able to reach in its deliberations?  There are several 
possibilities.  Perhaps the police had conducted an illegal search, thus violating 
defendant’s constitutional rights, and defense counsel intended to raise this issue.  
Possibly, the prosecutor recognized that the case would be lost if the trial judge 
excluded the evidence.  Or perhaps the defendant suffered from some cognitive 
disability that caused all parties, including the prosecutor, to feel enough sympathy 
to authorize such a plea.  The fact is we will never know why this defendant who 
was allowed to plead to a “legal fiction” was treated differently and much more 
leniently than others who have been charged with the same serious crimes.  The true 
reasons have been lost in the ether, shrouded by off-the-record conversations that 
often take place in the backroom. 
The parties in this case probably felt that the “creative” resolution amounted to 
some form of “rough justice,” where everyone was allowed to walk away with 
something.  The defense counsel most certainly rationalized that he or she achieved 
a just result for this client, successfully shielding the client from the potential 
consequences of the original charges, including years in prison and a lifetime 
obligation to register as a sexually oriented offender.  But what about the scores of 
other defendants who were not so fortunate, serving decades in prison and suffering 
collateral consequences?  How should they feel about such a resolution?  Tough 
luck?  Too bad for them?  They should have hired the right lawyers?  And what 
about future employers performing a background check on this individual?  They 
will never know whether or not they are actually hiring a sex offender.   
To examine this issue, I go back to the epiphany that I experienced during my 
first term in office: No one should ever say anything in the back room that they 
would not say out in the open and on the record. 
Years ago, as part of an ethics presentation, I had an opportunity to speak to a 
room full of trial court judges and present a hypothetical fact pattern that provided 
an example of how such a conversation might unfold in the backroom chambers of 
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a judge.  The question posed to this audience was simple: “would you or would you 
not accept the following plea?” 
 
Next Monday you have a serious rape trial set to go forward.  The 
victim, who is now 15 years old, claims that the defendant, her uncle, raped 
her on two occasions four years earlier when he was out of work and living 
temporarily with her mother, the defendant’s sister.  The victim claims that 
she kept the details of the incidents to herself, but after receiving the 
encouragement of a teacher, she decided to come forward with the charges. 
You meet with the prosecutor and defense attorney who both enter 
your chambers stating, “Judge, you’ll be happy to hear we have reached a 
resolution.”  Upon inquiry, the prosecutor states she will motion the Court 
to amend count 1 of the indictment from one count of rape to a charge of 
aggravated assault—a felony of the fourth degree.  All remaining counts 
would be dismissed in exchange for the plea.  She adds that the victim has 
been severely traumatized by what occurred and the thought of testifying 
in court in the presence of the defendant has her almost paralyzed with 
fear.  “The State will be advocating for prison time but we understand 
sentencing is totally up to your wise discretion.”   
You turn your attention to the defense attorney who says, “Judge, my 
guy swears up and down this stuff never happened but he’s not going to 
roll the dice on a mandatory life sentence.  He understands all the potential 
penalties he faces, and I will be prepared to argue in mitigation at the 
sentencing hearing. 
 
Each member of the audience of judges was equipped with an electronic responder.  
Interestingly, a little over half of the judges in the audience voted that they would 
not accept the proposed plea because the crime of aggravated assault was not a sex 
crime and had no resemblance to the crime of rape.  Rather, it was a lower level 
physical assault crime that included an element of provocation by the alleged victim.  
The remainder of judges in the room voted that they would accept the plea 
agreement.  A vigorous debate immediately took place among the audience members 
in an attempt to defend their opposing positions.  
In 2015, when the Ohio Supreme Court Commission on the Rules of Practice 
and Procedure considered whether to join the federal system and a handful of states 
that had outlawed factually-baseless pleas,15 the effort received support from the 
editorial boards of The Cleveland Plain Dealer, The Columbus Dispatch, nationally 
recognized academics in the field of legal ethics (including Professor Bruce Green 
 
15  OHIO CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N, ANN. REPORT 20 (2015). 
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from Fordham University and Professor Jack Sahl from the Akron School of Law), 
the Cleveland Rape Crisis Center, and the Ohio Alliance to End Sexual Violence.16  
The Ohio Prosecuting Attorney’s Association did not submit any formal 
objection to the measure.  However, Tim Young, the Ohio State Public Defender, 
articulated a thoughtful measured response that contained many valid reasons why 
the majority of the defense bar is wary of moving in this direction.17  He pointed out 
that practitioners in our flawed system operate under numerous draconian laws.18  
(Some examples are the current sexual registration laws and mandatory prison 
specifications that strip trial court discretion and inhibit their ability to mitigate 
severe and unjust results when the facts of the case warrant it.) 
I completely agree with Mr. Young on this point.  Where we differ is in what 
the response should be.  The answer, in my opinion, is not to continue a duplicitous 
practice that commits a fraud upon the citizens we serve.  Instead, the answer is to 
reform the laws he has identified and create diversionary programs for situations 
where the collateral consequences in a case justify treating the defendant differently 
than those in situations where such consequences do not exist. 
Many trial court judges in this state could testify that the current sexual 
registration laws have required them to register individuals that they do not believe 
pose a threat to the public.  In my opinion, these laws currently operate in a way that 
actually places the public in a greater state of peril.  This is because there are bona 
fide sexual predators who live in our communities, and if we are going to have 
registration programs, those predators should definitely be listed on them.  But given 
the manner in which the current laws operate, the information surrounding these 
individuals becomes diluted within a sea of mandatory registrants who pose no threat 
to the public—at least not the type of threat that these laws proport to protect against.  
If these laws are not reformed to provide trial court judges with discretion to register 
only those who deserve registration, practitioners will continue in their attempts to 
circumvent the system in order for defendants to receive what they perceive as a just 
result.  The public will continue, however, to be left with a false sense of security.  
Here’s an example to highlight the issue.  I once had a case in which a 19-year-
old male was charged with having a consensual, though unlawful, sexual 
relationship with a 15-year-old female.  Because the defendant and victim were 
slightly over four years apart in age, a conviction would leave me with no choice but 
to register the defendant for a 25-year period as a sexually-oriented offender.  
Defense counsel indicated before trial that the defendant would not plead to any 
 
16  See Rachel Dissell, Should Ohio ban judges from banning plea deals that are ‘lies’? (poll), 
THE PLAIN DEALER (May 30, 2015), https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2015/05/should_ohio_
change_what_plea_d.html.; and Randy Ludlow, Plea deals must reflect crime committed, judges 
demand, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/
local/2015/09/18/judges-pleas-must-reflect-crime.html. 
17  Tim Young, Ohio Public Defender, Public Comments to Proposed Amendment to Ohio Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 11 (2015). 
18  Id. 
434  OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW  Vol. 17:423 
offense that would result in a sexual registration requirement and the parties were at 
an impasse.  We began the jury selection portion of the trial. 
Before we returned to the courtroom after the lunch break, the attorneys 
appeared at my chambers door and asked if they could come back and discuss a 
potential resolution they had reached and would like me to consider.  I told them I 
would be glad to, but I discuss everything out in open court on the record.  So, we 
all walked out into the courtroom.   
The defendant, looking very young and very scared, sat at the trial table.  The 
courtroom was filled with spectators, including the defendant’s parents and family 
members, the victim’s family members, and various members of the general public.  
This was actually the first time I captured a proposed “legal fiction” plea agreement 
on the record.  If it had been discussed in the backroom as the lawyers desired it 
would have prevented the public from learning the case specifics and just how 
“creative” certain legal fictions can get.  The following is a formal transcript excerpt 
reflecting the actual exchange between myself and the parties with the identities of 
all involved removed. 
 
TUESDAY AFTERNOON SESSION, AUGUST 2016: 
 
THE COURT: We’re back on the trial.  This is the state of Ohio versus 
John Doe.  The parties want to address the Court.  Is there a proposed 
plea or something? 
THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY: I believe the prosecutor has a 
recommendation she’d like to make to the Court, and we would like 
to be heard if we could. 
THE PROSECUTOR: That is correct, your Honor.  During the break, we 
did have time to review the case and talk with our witnesses. 
At this time, we are prepared to make an amendment to Count I different 
from that that was placed on the record. 
We would be prepared to amend Count I by deleting the furthermore—
forgive me.  Amending the furthermore language to indicate that the 
offender is less than four years older than the person with whom the 
offender engaged in sexual conduct.  That will then make this a 
Misdemeanor 1. 
Further within this, there is no allegations it was non-consensual sex.  It 
is agreed upon by all the parties this was, in fact, consensual sex, and, 
therefore, it would be non-registerable offense. 
So it is unlawful sexual conduct with a minor with the discrepancy being 
less than four years with the agreement it’s consensual, so no 
registration. 
THE COURT: In fact, they are more than four years? 
THE PROSECUTOR: That is correct. 
THE COURT: So you would be stipulating to a fallacy? 
THE PROSECUTOR: That is correct, your Honor. 
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I explained to the parties that the proposed plea agreement violated the court’s policy 
of requiring a factual basis for guilty pleas, and that I was inclined to reject their 
proposal.  I then had a lengthy exchange with the prosecutor, who clearly saw valid 
reasons why the case merited a plea with no registration requirement.  It seemed, 
given the circumstances of this case, that the requirement was unduly harsh and 
unnecessary for public safety.  The case also involved a victim who still had feelings 
for the young defendant and was reluctant to testify against him in the first place.  
What was the state’s end game, I inquired?  The state understandably wanted 
the defendant to have no further contact with the victim, at least until she had reached 
an age where the law would permit it.  I inquired whether the state’s diversion 
program would accept the defendant and place those requirements upon him.  The 
prosecutor indicated that unfortunately office policy banned all sex offenses from its 
diversion program.  The prosecutor then suggested the offense of contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor.  Are there facts, I inquired, that if true, would support the 
charge?  The prosecutor outlined the numerous occasions where the defendant had 
encouraged and assisted the victim to sneak out of her home after curfew.  I told 
parties that if the defendant was willing to waive all procedural defects (because that 
was not what he was charged with in the first place) I would accept that proposal to 
resolve the case.  
The guilty plea would have been factually based, the state would have reached 
its goal of having some supervision placed upon the defendant, the defendant would 
have avoided harsh unnecessary collateral consequences, and if any member of the 
public wanted to take issue with the resolution, a transcript existed holding me 
accountable for accepting the resolution in the first place.  Ultimately, the prosecutor 
decided to dismiss this case without prejudice.  
This experience led me to work with the court’s technology department to learn 
how often this “stipulation to a fallacy” was occurring in cases involving unlawful 
sex with a minor.  I also wondered if it occurred only when the age discrepancy 
between the defendant was close to the four-year separation that the law 
prohibited.19  The data I uncovered revealed approximately twenty-five cases over a 
three-year period, and as expected the vast majority of the cases involved age 
differences that were barely over four years.  A few glaring discrepancies did exist, 
however, including one case where the defendant was 28 years older than the 
underage victim.  
 
VI. RIPE FOR REFORM 
 
I am hopeful that the reflections contained within this article will motivate 
stakeholders in our system to discuss what I believe are necessary reforms.  
Attorneys, judges, legislators, and advocacy groups should have an opportunity to 
sit down and take their “hats off” so to speak and ask two simple questions: “what 
 
19  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04(B)(2) (West 2020).  
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is actually occurring in the system?” and “how can we improve things in such a way 
that will increase public confidence in our courts?”  
I recently had the honor of testifying before the American Bar Association Task 
Force on Plea Bargaining in Washington D.C.  This impressive group, comprised of 
lawyers, judges, legal academics, and policy advocates, is examining these very 
issues on a national scale in both the federal and state systems.  My vision is an Ohio 
task force similar to the many successful task forces Chief Justice Maureen 
O’Connor has created over her tenure to complement the ABA’s work and 
implement the inevitable reforms this group will put forth when their work is 
complete.  Issues I would like the task force to examine include:  
 
• What resources would it take to create a centralized database to track 
every criminal sentence issued in our state with information available 
to advocates and judges to allow for meaningful comparison and 
analyses promoting both consistency and proportionality throughout 
the state of Ohio? 
• What role should the judge play in the plea negotiation process?  Are 
there certain rules that can be created to promote more uniformity and 
fairness?  Why do some judges accept agreed sentences and some do 
not?  Is it acceptable for a judge to suggest to a prosecutor how to 
exercise their discretion?  Is it ever acceptable for a judge to prevent 
a prosecutor from dismissing a case? 
• What are the existing laws (for example, sexual registration laws and 
mandatory sentencing laws) that advocates and judges perceive as 
“tying their hands” in such a fashion that they are unable to negotiate 
fair resolutions in certain criminal cases and tempt them to 
circumvent these laws with fictional pleas?  How can these laws be 
changed to provide the trial courts with much needed discretion? 
• In a fair justice system, should a defendant who enters a negotiated 
plea agreement know, at least within reason, what benefit they are 
receiving in exchange for the admission they are providing?  And 
should the defendant know at the plea hearing what position the 
prosecutor will be advocating for at the sentencing hearing so as to 
avoid sentencing by ambush? 
• Are there certain plea agreements in our system that are so coercive 
that they should be outlawed as unethical?  For instance, when a plea 
is negotiated before a post-conviction relief hearing is held, at which 
the incarcerated defendant intends to demonstrate actual innocence.  
On some occasions, the prosecutor will offer a defendant the 
opportunity to plead to the charges to which he or she has already 
achieved a conviction.  In exchange for defendant’s plea, the 
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prosecutor will negotiate a release from prison.20  In these 
circumstances, the defendant has no leverage or bargaining power.  In 
my opinion, this plea is so coercive it is the legal equivalent to holding 
a gun to a defendant’s head to force the plea’s acceptance. 
• Can our rules that outline the ethical obligations of prosecutors be 
strengthened?  Can we offer guidance through rule changes to ensure 
that prosecutors at all times maintain a “good faith” belief in the guilt 
of the accused with direction to fully dismiss charges or vacate 
convictions if available information suggests they cannot maintain 
such a belief? 
• Should the legislature create an “accountability benefit,” i.e., a 
mechanism similar to Ohio’s attempt statute, that would provide the 
defendant with the benefit of a reduced sentence but more accurately 
and honestly inform the public as to how it was utilized to resolve the 
case? 
 
Ohio’s citizens deserve the assurance that the outcomes of every dispute in our 
criminal justice system are based in fact, based in truth.  Further, all citizens should 
rightly expect that everyone who enters the system either as the accuser or the 
accused will be treated fairly and according to the rule of law.  We, the current 
members of the legal profession, have an obligation to work together for the next 
generation of lawyers and judges and deliver a system better than the one we found 
both in principle and in practice.  
 
20  I call this type of plea a “dark plea.” David Akadjian, Dark Pleas and the Justice Gap: 7 
Questions for Michael Donnelly, Candidate for Ohio’s Supreme Court, DAILY KOS (Sep. 30, 2018, 
6:30 PM), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2018/9/30/1799071/-Dark-pleas-and-the-justice-gap-7-
questions-for-Michael-Donnelly-candidate-for-Ohio-s-Supreme-Court. 
